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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The t' - I L/iw in1.1 i s s u e s n r n p r e s e n t e d f o r r e v i e w : 
1 . W h e t h e r a c a s e w h i c h h a s fo-;e--i d i s m i s s e d w i t h p r e j u d i c e 
c a n b e r e - o p e n e d s n d r ^ - ^ r i e d a f t e r t h e e x p i r a r , 1 
i n w u : n a n appe-* 
2 . What i& Lhe e f f e c t o f Lhe i r r e g u l a r c o u r t p r o c e e d i n g s 
i n w h i c h t h r e e j u d g m e n t s w e r e r e n d e r e d on t h e same c a u s e o f 
a c t i o n w h i c h w e r e con t r i a i c t > * ,- . a s i d e t h e 
v n e t i e r F i n d i n g s o f F a c t w e r e p r o p e r l y e x e c u t e d . 
" W h e t h e r t h e A p p e l l a n t o r i ho R e s p o n d e n r b r e c i o n e d t h e 
con I: ra c t i: r c:ori t ra <;"!: s . i i i s s u e . 
^ . W h e t h e r t h e c a s e s h o u l d b e r e v e r s e d a n d r e m a n d e d f o r 
f u r t h e r p r o c e e d i n g s o r s i m p l y r e v e r s e d . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
T h i s i s a n a c t i o n w h i c h was commenced i n S m a l l C l a i m s C o u r t 
w h i c h i n v o l v e s a c o n t r a c t f o r t h e s a l e o f a m o t o r v e h i c l e i * : 
a c o n t r a c t f o r a sec i , .. ' - a t r a c t s w e r e v a l i d 
inri r.>nfi n l i a b l e , w h e t h e r t h e y w e r e b r e a c h e d a n d b y whu ;, i-id i f 
l h e A p p e l l a n t i s e n t i t l e d '• o m o f f s e t . The p r o p r i e t y 
r e g u l a r m a n n e r . * . . t h i s c n b e wi& h a n d l e d g n x-edu rv? I y by t h e 
S nt, i I 1 C" I i i ,ri;;? " w h i c h t h e R e s p o n d e n t ' s (who was t h e P l a i n -
t i f f b e l o w ) c a s e was d i s m i s s e d a t c c i \ 1 b u : t h e n r e - o p e n e d s n d 
t h e w r i t t e n c o n t r a c t ( R e c o r d Ex . " ' The d i s m i s s a l o t t n e c a s e 
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w i t h p r e j u d i c e which was e n t e r e d from t h e b e n c h was n o t a s i d e by 
any w r i t t e n o r spoken e n t r y . No w r i t t e n f i n d i n g s o f f a c t a n d c o n -
c l u s i o n s of law were e n t e r e d i n s u p p o r t of t h e judgment a l t h o u g h 
r e c i t a l s i n s u p p o r t t h e r e o f were made on t h e t a p e . 
A Mot ion f o r New T r i a l n e x t a p p e a r s i n t h e r e c o r d (Record 
Ex. 10) a l t h o u g h i t i s b l a n k a n d u n s i g n e d by any p a r t y . A h e a r i n g 
was h e l d on August 7, 1987 (Tape 1649) a t wh ich t i m e no r u l i n g 
on t h e Mot ion f o r New T r i a l was made b u t f u r t h e r e v i d e n c e was r e -
c e i v e d and t h e c a s e was t a k e n u n d e r a d v i s e m e n t . A f u r t h e r h e a r i n g 
was h e l d Sep tember 9, 1987, from w h i c h an a d d i t i o n a l judgment 
i s s u e d (Record Ex. 1 5 ) . The Index of T r a n s c r i p t h e r e i n i n d i c a t e s 
t h a t a Tape 1851 was made of t h e p r o c e e d i n g b u t no s u c h t a p e was 
fo rwa rded t o t h i s C o u r t . No w r i t t e n f i n d i n g s of f a c t o r c o n c l u -
s i o n s of law were e n t e r e d . The p r e s e n t a p p e a l was t a k e n f o l l o w -
i n g e n t r y of t h a t judgment (Record Ex. 1 8 ) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The evidence i s uncontroverted that i t was the Respon-
dent who defaulted in her payments under the Apri l 13, 1987, 
wit ten contract and tha t Appellant was e n t i t l e d to repossess the 
motor van. Respondent i s accordingly not e n t i t l e d to any judg-
ment. 
2. The court los t i t s j u r i sd i c t ion when i t made i t s d i s -
missal with prejudice and had no author i ty to re-open the case or 
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t o r e n d e r s u b s e q u e n t j u d g m e n t s . 
UIKJMI I he o u i i o f / 'vaoenls A d m i n i s t r a t i v e O r d e i I a n d 
t h i s C o u r t ' s r u l i n g i n M e i e r v . Hobbs & S o n s , 61 U t a h A d v a n c e R e -
p o r t s 53 ( U t a h C t . App. 1 9 8 7 ) , t h e j ' i d a m e n t b e Lag a p p e a . - . - ; 
must b e v a c a t e d a s 1 t i a => c • ' v* c a s e was 
t a k e n u n d e r a d v i s e m e n t a n d no f i n d i n g s o f f a c t o r c o n c l u s i o n s o f 
law w e r e e n t e r e d . 
ARGUMENT 
p 0 I N T j 
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT A 
JUDGMENT IN RESPONDENT'S FAVOR. 
, J.J v : i e n t i r e * ] iin !" Ivi s m a t t e r on J u l y 1 , 1987 ( R e -
c o r d Ex* - , ^*;u September 9# 1987 ( R e c o r d Ex.. 15^ were p u r p o r t e d 
i n T a p e 1313 t o b e b a s e d u p o n t h e e x i s t e n c e o t a , > m c o n t r . n ' l : MI 
wr i t : 1.1:19 I" ApLiI I 1, I >'•{ '" w i n c h r e q u i r e d r e s p o n d e n t t o make p a y -
m e n t s o f $ 5 0 . 0 0 p e r w e e ; ; . The c u u i _ f „ , n d t h a t R e s p o n d e n t ' s t e n -
d e r o f o n e payment o n A p r i l ^^
 t l^Qnf "kept h e r f rom b e i n g i n d e -
fau^- ~ , jtinn! I ^ <, . ^ . • ;•- < : n ^ c -\: i j r - ^ e m e n t 
I') y r ep o a .s <» s s i \ i. .j t he mo t o r va n . 
The e v i d e n c e a s g i v e n on T a p e s n 0 ' 7 7 ~.nd ] ?*» ? w ^ ? u n c o n t r a -
d i c t e d t h a t R e s p o n d e n t ma-ie . •* .< J - . - •. s :* .-
1987 , and c o n s e q u e n t ] y wa i n d e f a u l t a n d e i m e e x p r e s s t e r m s j f 
t h e w r i t t e n c o n t r a c t . A p p e l l a n t t h e r e f o r e was e n t i t l e d t o r e p o -
s s e s s t h e m o t o r van a s o f Mv7 -./ . . . : . • \ e ? ; - l -
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ted tha t the contract required Respondent to obtain fu l l cover-
age automotive insurance and tha t she did not do so . She t e s t i -
fied that she had offered Appellant $42•00 to make the payment 
therefore on his own coverage (Tape 1077). Appellant however a l so 
t e s t i f i e d that the only persons covered under his own pol icy was 
for persons who resided with him which Respondent did not . Re-
spondent further s ta ted she was covered by her boyfriend's p o l i -
cy since she l ived with him and h is coverage was for a l l automo-
b i l e s which he drove whether he owned i t or not . There was no 
evidence produced that t h i s would therefore cover the Respondent 
when she drove but the boyfriend/ Lloyd ? did t e s t i f y 
that he did not even own any automobile (Tape 1313). To assume 
tha t he had a fu l l coverage pol icy for an automobile he did not 
own which include Respondent under i t s coverage is an assumption 
which s t r a i n s c redul i ty and i s not j u s t i f i ed by any factual or 
legal theory. 
There was further subs tan t i a l evidence a t both major hear-
ings tha t Appellant had every reason to bel ieve tha t his c o l l a t -
t e r a l secur i ty would become impaired and tha t Respondent did not 
have the means or in tent ion to make payments thereon (Tapes 1077 
and 1313). 
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THE COURT TERMINATED ITS 
JURISDICTION TO SNTER ANY JUDGMENT. 
The l o w e r c o u r t . i . o i i u s s e a t n - c a s e a t t e i i Mil I I r M l un 
J . ^ . A . 7 8 - 6 - 1 0 p r o v i d e s t h a t was 
c o n c l u s i v e u p o n t h e R e s p o n d e n t u n l e s s t c o u n t e r c l a i m was f i l e d , 
w h i c h t h e r e was rrni- . \ d e f e n d a n t h=*s o n l y f i v e d a y s i n w h : / - t o 
a p p e a l a n a . - - r r i r 
e x p r e s s e d i n C o u r t o f A p p e a l s A d m i n i s t r a t i v e O r d e r 1 • ;>-  ? s m a l l 
c l a i m s m a t t e r s " b e h a n d l e d s p e e d i l y a n d i n f o r m a l l y . " 
The r e c o r d r e f l e c t s t h a t a Moti e e o f C o n t i n u a n c e was f i ] ed 
idgment s t a t i n g t h a t t h e c a s e w h i c h h a d a l r e a d y 
o s e n t r i e d a n d d e c i d e d was n o n e t h e l e s s b e i n g c o n t i n u e 1 ( R e c o r d 
Ex . 4 ) • J u d g e L a w r e n c e e x p l a i n e d a t t l le cot it i r n ie< :i h e a r :l ig I : h a t 
ii cne r e s p o n d e n t t h a t he h a d on h i s 
own r e v i e w e d t h e a p p l i c a b l e l a w s a n d d e c i d e d t h a t h i s l i s m i s s a l 
was b a s e d on e r r o r ( T a p e 1 3 0 6 ) . He b a s e d •:. IL~ -V.:-. ion noon xi>...-
6 0 ( b ) , I J R C I ! • H • = • ; i 21 1 1 :: i i t • 3 s a. } t: 1 ic t 1 1 l e ::»r i g i na 1 o r a l c o n t r a c t 
R e s p o n d e n t was s u i n g u n d e r was v o i d s- . ie r he S t a t u t e -^f F r a u d s 
a n d t h a t t h e w r i t t e n c o n t r a c t w h i c h . .«».: j . . i *~ * , 
h e a r i n g wa •; i', h . . i o* < "' - :-*- :•• - ss was not 
void but was voidable. He uh^n continued tne matter for further 
hearing* 
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For the court on i t s own, although in response to an ex par te 
contact from Respondent, to purport to use the three month leeway 
of Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P. to get around t h i s l imited ju r i sd ic t ion 
as to time defeats the po l icy and s p i r i t of the nature of small 
claims matters* The dismissal with prejudice in t h i s matter t e r -
minated the cou r t ' s j u r i s d i c t i o n . Neither that court nor any 
other court of l imited ju r i sd i c t ion has any au thor i ty to create 
i t s own jur i sd ic t ion* No order was ever made or entered pursuant 
to Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P. or any other au thor i ty which set as ide 
the dismissal . The court fur ther never made any indicat ion of 
what provis ion of Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P. i t was relying on and what 
the speci f ic facts supporting such re l iance were. 
In Morris v. Russell , 236 P.2d 451 (Ut.Sup.Ct. 1951), the 
court indicated tha t if the ends of jus t i ce require i t tha t a 
court has the power to vacate a p r i o r ruling dismissing a count 
and to r e i n s t a t e the count i f done during t r i a l . There i s no 
au thor i ty for doing a f t e r a t r i a l is concluded and a f t e r the time 
for i n i t i a t i n g an appeal has expired. 
The lower court therefore had no legal bas i s for conducting 
the new t r i a l which i t did on July 1, 1987 (Tape 1313) which r e -
sul ted in a judgment being entered (Record Ex. 5) . That judgment 
is suspect on other grounds in tha t a t the commencement of the 
hearing the same Judge pro tern Victor Lawrence s ta ted that "The 
- 9 -
d r u g s h a v e n ' t t a k e n e f f e c t y e t so I 'm s t i l l t i r e d . " That judge 
a l s o r e f e r r e d t o h i s d rug u s e a t t h e n e x t h e a r i n g on August 7 , 
1987 (Tape 1649) . 
POINT I I I 
THE JUDGMENTS SHOULD BE VACATED. 
The lower c o u r t e n t e r e d a judgment a f t e r t h a t J u l y 1, 1987, 
h e a r i n g (Record Ex. 5 ) . No f i n d i n g s of f a c t o r c o n c l u s i o n s of law 
were e n t e r e d a l t h o u g h on Tape 1373 t h e judge s t a t e d t h a t t h e 
March/ 1987, o r a l c o n t r a c t was v o i d unde r t h e S t a t u t e of F rauds 
and t h a t t h e A p r i l 1 3 , 1987, w r i t t e n c o n t r a c t was n o t v o i d and 
had n o t been o b t a i n e d by d u r e s s and t h a t A p p e l l a n t had b r e a c h e d 
i t by r e p o s s e s s i n g t h e motor home. As t h e Respondent was n o t 
s u i a g fo r s p e c i f i c p e r f o r m a n c e he awarded Respondent judgment fo r 
t h e amount she had p a i d u n d e r t h e o r a l c o n t r a c t wh ich he had s a i d 
was v o i d anyway, i n t h e amount of $ 4 2 0 . 0 0 . 
Both p a r t i e s had s t i p u l a t e d a t t h a t h e a r i n g t h a t A p p e l l a n t 
was e n t i t l e d t o an o f f s e t from t h a t amount fo r t h e amount he 
c o u l d p r o v e was R e s p o n d e n t ' s s h a r e of l i v i n g e x p e n s e s which s h e 
owed him (Tape 1 3 7 3 ) . A Motion f o r New T r i a l was f i l e d u n s i g n e d 
and t h e p a r t i e s came b e f o r e t h e c o u r t a g a i n f o r a h e a r i n g on t h e 
amount of o f f s e t t o wh ich A p p e l l a n t was e n t i t l e d (Tape 1 6 4 9 ) . No 
r u l i n g was made o r a l l y o r i n w r i t i n g t o t h e u n s i g n e d Motion toe 
New T r i a l . 
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After tha t August 7, 1987, hearing, the judge expressly 
took the matter under advisement. The record r e f l e c t s in the In -
dex of Transcript that a judgment was rendered in open court on 
September 9, 1987, on Tape 1851, which is re f lec ted in the Judg-
ment(Record Ex. 15). I t i s unknown if any reasons supporting that 
judgment were given since that tape was not forwarded by the low-
er court to t h i s Court. In any event, no wri t ten findings of fact 
or conclusions of law were made. The new judgment seems in fact 
be an amendment of the July 1, 1987, judgment although i t does 
not on i t s face show tha t . As the s t a t e of the record is tha t 
both judgments are i n t ac t , t h i s i s an addi t iona l judgment to 
which Respondent is c l ea r ly not e n t i t l e d . 
Rule 52(a), U.R.C.P. requires that wri t ten findings of fact 
and conclusions of law be made in t h i s ins tance. The Supreme 
Court s t a t ed in Parks v. Zions F i r s t Nat. Bank, 673 P.2d 590 
(Ut.Sup.Ct. 1983) t h a t : 
Rule 52(a) requires that a trial court find facts 
specially in all actions tried upon the facts without 
a jury. Such findings of fact must clearly indicate 
the "mind of the court," and must resolve all issues 
of material fact necessary to justify the conclusions 
of law and judgment entered thereon. Furthermore, 
failure of a trial court to enter adequate findings 
requires the judgment to be vacated. 
Rule 52(a), U.R.C.P. was subsequently modiEied to allow the 
findings to be stated orally and recorded in open court. 
After the creation of this Court, this Court promulgated 
its Administrative Order 1 which liberalized these requirements 
- 1 1 -
somewhat . Tha t Order was i n t e r p r e t e d by t h i s Cour t i n Meier v 
Hobbs & Sons , 61 Utah Advance R e p o r t s 53 ( U t . C t . A p p . 1 9 8 7 ) . I n 
t h i s m a t t e r t h e t a p e s ( s e e Tape 1649) r e f l e c t t h a t t h e o r i g i n a l 
judgment was b e i n g m o d i f i e d p u r s u a n t t o t h e s t i p u l a t i o n of t h e 
p a r t i e s t o a l l o w A p p e l l a n t an o f f s e t a g a i n s t t h e amount of t h e 
judgment f o r l i v i n g e x p n s e s c h a r g e a b l e t o R e s p o n d e n t . The amount 
and n a t u r e of t h a t o f f s e t was d i s p u t e d a t t h e h e a r i n g (Tape 
1 6 4 9 ) . T h i s Cour t ha s no way t o r e v i e w t h e lower c o u r t ' s d e t e r -
m i n a t i o n of t h e r e s o l u t i o n of t h o s e i s s u e s . 
Even u n d e r t h e l i b e r a l i z e d r e q u i r e m e n t s of A d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
Orde r 1, w r i t t e n f i n d i n g s must be made where a judgment i s r e n -
d e r e d a f t e r a m a t t e r was t a k e n u n d e r a d v i s e m e n t . T h a t ha s n o t 
b e e n done h e r e i n . 
CONCLUSION 
The R e s p o n d e n t ' s c a u s e of a c t i o n f a i l s on i t s m e r i t s b e -
cause of h e r b r e a c h of t h e t e r m s o f t h e w r i t t e n a g r e e m e n t . She i s 
n o t e n t i t l e d t o any judgment in h e r f a v o r . The lower c o u r t a f t e r 
d i s m i s s i n g t h e m a t t e r w i t h p r e j u d i c e a t t h e o r i g i n a l t r i a l d i d 
n o t p o s s e s s a u t h o r i t y t o r e - o p e n t h e c a s e and r e - t r y i t a f t e r t h e 
r u n n i n g of t h e a p p l i c a b l e p e r i o d i n wh ich t o f i l e a n a p p e a l . The 
lower c o u r t m a n i f e s t e d numerous p r o c e d u r a l i r r e g u l a r i t i e s which 
i n c l u d e d t h e u s e of d r u g s by t h e h e a r i n g j u d g e , f a i l u r e t o e n t e r 
any o r d e r s e t t i n g a s i d e t h e d i s m i s s a l , f a i l u r e t o e n t e r any o r d e r 
- 1 2 -
g r a n t i n g a new t r i a l , c o n d u c t i n g a new t r i a l a n d r e n d e r i n g two 
judgments t h e r e o n f o r t h e same t h i n g w i t h o u t s e t t i n g a s i d e t h e 
f i r s t judgment and t h e n f a i l i n g t o make w r i t t e n f i n d i n g s of f a c t 
and c o n c l u s i o n s of l aw . The judgment must be v a c a t e d s o t h a t a l l 
o f t h e d e c i s i o a s of t h e lower c o u r t s h o u l d be r e v e r s e d e x c e p t fo r 
t h a t wh ich d i s m i s s e d t h e a c t i o n w i t h p r e j u d i c e - t h e r e l i e f t o 
w h i c h A p p e l l a n t i s now e n t i t l e d . 
DATED t h i s 2 4 t h day of November, 1987 . 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY t h a t I m a i l e d a t r u e and c o r r e c t copy of 
t h e f o r e g o i n g t o Debra L . Abney, Respondent P ro Se a t 784 Ash ton 
Avenue, # 3 , S a l t Lake C i t y , U tah 841^6 t h i s 2 4 t h day of November, 
1987. 
ADDENDUM 
te 
UTAH CODE 
19TM9W 
ION FOR A.DIRECTED '<^~-*i 
ID FOR JUDGMENT-.^wibitxn 
AND1NGTHE VERDICTiTitMn-
etc* Vetdkt; What Made; EXftcL -,oii^ 
festal Notwpkrfaadief tt» Veraicfc ^ w 
«al RttJUgs Q« Grimt of M o W ^ . ^ ^ 
M^cted Verdkt; W h e a M a d e ; ^ ^ 
moves foe *4frectedverd&aiithc 
idence offered by ao opponent may 
In the event that tfce, motion, is not 
a having reserved the right sof-to do 
»e. extent as if, the motioa i had; not * 
notion foraalrectedver^ 
not a waiver;iof .trial*by- jury, even 
ties to the action have moved- for 
to... A motion for .a directed verdict 
specific ground[s] therefor. The order 
inting a motion for a directed verdict 
o^ai lya^tof the iury: ; ^ ^ [ 
jvdgmeatNotwithstanding ther^ar^ 
motion [for a directed verdict:made at 
l ithe evidence^ isidenied'; or for-any 
panted,4the>court-U decmed-to have 
ae^^tojtheduryisuhje^ 
oft the! legal-questions raisedxby? the ~ 
oer. than ten u , ; i after'etttt^of jud-
r who has'moved for a'directed'vertUct 
Ihave the;verdkt\and,any]judgment 
»'set?aside>and: toVhave^:judgment 
ardance with his motion for a directed 
iiverdict was not returned such party, 
m after the jury has been discharged; 
w judgment in accordance with.his 
Erected verdict. A motion; for: a hew 
oined with this motion, or a new .trial 
sd for in the alternative. If a verdict 
the court may allow the judgment to 
'reopen the judgment. and^dthcr{order 
direct the entry of judgment as if; the 
diet had been directed. I fno 5 verdict 
the court may idirect the entry; of jud-
ae requested verdict had been directed 
i new trial. .' v'/l;'-"'' ••:• '^^l'-x 
tfltiosal Rulings on Grant of Motion. 
motion for judgment notwithstanding 
wovided for in subdivision (b) of this 
Med, the court shall also rule on the 
a new trial,..it .any, by determining 
houid,. be granted, if the„ judgment is 
Bated or reversed, and shall specify^the 
panting or denying the motion for^a 
«fee motion for a new trial it thus con-
•tod; the order, thereonl doesVnot affect 
CttevJudgm(»trinrcaaeJt^e/.modoii;f6r' 
aer been conditionally granted and; the 
teversed on-appeal, the new^ trial shall 
otrthe appeUate: court- hasiotherwisc 
anr the motion for a new trial has been, 
'denied, the respondent on appeal may, :, 
in that denial; and if the judgment is 
appeal, subsequent proceedings shall be 
e with the order of the appellate court.' *** 
•TT whose verdict has been set aside on 
jadgment notwithstanding the ^ verdict 
tfor a new.trial pursuant to-Rule 
7teadays.afteryentry^of^the; judg-
M
" \ the^ycrdict. ti>4 ^i&fc^citfbtf •-;" 
USpppg ^ gfffe, tfgfi ;Coce»Co ^v. 
UTAH CODE"1 
19tM9S8' Utah Rirt^r6fXavfl Proctaurr RULE 53" 
.motions granted under Rules. 12(b),' 50(a) and (by, . 
156, and 59 when the motion is. based on more than« 
J one groimdJipialjiajw^ -... 
' $ ^ o ^ ^ 
•- Upoa-mpuon, of a party madenot later than? ten' ~ 
•.ppea.te;co«rt:rev««l.ite j«dgmentfnothtag>l*|| l ^ ^ j V d S ? S W > ^ ^ o t f ; n » f • 
be made withla^motion,;fot*a^ewtrM pursuanttb^ 
Rule ,59.sWhen findlngs^of fact are made inactions7' 
tried by'thecourt without*aTju i^ Ac question of the*' v 
[sufficiency of'the^evidenc^ to supportjthe Tmdin s^f ^ 
1 may • theteafter be raised whether or not the party5" "r 
raising the question has made in the district court an ^ 
objection * to" such" .findings ?or^  has made jrither!^ 
motion to amend them, a motion for judgment^  or kJ 
(c) Waiver of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of ^ f 
niExcept in actions:for. divorce, findings of fact and1 jcopclusions of law may be waived bytHe parties.toV A 
an issue of fact?- 1^Zr: * * '•';' • •-'. .Vlil- '^ \-:^. v^fi:' 
t A (I) By default or by failing to appear at the trial; ?£•• ? \ 
ra(2XBy)jpnsent in writing,.filed in.the: cause; ^ . ? ^ ^ ^ \r 
f (b). Reference ?l & - ^^^^m;;^m^i&& 
( c ) *cwe i i . ~ ; ;^^ : 
(d) ProCttttiMS. Wr^uLX:^ u i «^oSiaJ .J^j>r i^^: i^^«*sk , ', 
(d) Same: Denial of Motion. |ti?-;:.••"<.«&& ' ^ ^ v ^ ^ f 
< If the motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict is 'denied, the party- who prevailed on that 
motion mayVJas respondent,' assert grounds entitling*) 
him 1 to a new trial in *he events rhe appellate courts | 
• conchides.that^the tria^ 'coWt;OT 
motionv 
. the a eflate c u>t teverse^ ^ 
this Rule precludes^it ifrc^v detennining^that »thei 
respondent* is entitled to a new trial, or from direct 
ting the trial court to detennine whether a new triali 
shall be granted. 16'*^kSk&sk*& X*&XUBQ. ik£kl<xta wua 
Rwi'5i?l^STRUCnONS TO1 J U * Y t f ^ ^ t ^ 
.i At. the dose of the evidence or at such earlier^ time 
as the court: reasonably .directs,CanyJ party^payjfile^ 
written requests" t^hat Vthe^ ioourt instruct the jury bn\ 
the law as set forth in ^ said "requests,!.The^  court shall 
inform counsel qt Its' proposed action *uj>bn"the^ 
requests prior; tp instructing the jury;*, and it shall' 
furnish counsel with a copy of. its proposed instru-
ctions, unless the parties stipulate that such instru-
ctions may be given orally or. otherwise waive this 
requirement^ If ^ the^mstru^ons are to^be, given jr^ 
writin^^aU objections;thercto mu^^ 
objecUona may^ be^made 'to. the im^ructiojas^afte^ 
. they w r£Sve¥ tVtho 
' to'consider its verdlct.rNo"party miy'asii^ 
the giving or tfref ailure to give "an jnsti^ction^unless 
he objem^jfiiereto.vInrobjecting^.tolhe*givingrof an^  
iristi^ction7^a party must sta^ 
to, which \ he objects "and the grounds for his~6bjcc-
tion, Notwithstandingi the t foregoing requirement;) 
the appellate; court, in its discretion and in the int-
erests of justice; may review the giving of or failure: 
to give an instruction. Opportunity shall be given to 
make objections, and they shall be made, out of the 
hearing of the jury. •'-?_ 
,, Arguments for.the respective parties shall be made 
after ,the courr has? instructed i^ the'jury;- The court 
shall not comment on the evidence-in ^rca^,", and; 
i f the court states any >oY'the'e\ddcn^7^:^^c^^ 
ruct the jurors that they, are the exclusive judges. Q£ 
- - all questions of ^  fact.- -* - - rnnf^ r^rpi'xf^ wanj??' .??$:'*Ti2Tt' 
RULE 52. FINDINGS BY THE C O U R T : ^ , : : i ^ 
(t) Effect. ";---^^:;^-\. •';:.•[:;.-y . 5 ; — * \ -
(b)Afrtmft . •;r:.'H- • .- * ;'":"''.:r.?:" ••*-" ;^ ;';";-; 
(c) Wa«vcr of Fladings of Fact aad Coaehutoas of Law. .ip.] 
- ( a ) E f f e c t . ' T--M^•rt~-ma«^w".«-.r.--:•.<&&.*>»Hfr%St&i-&ti*iii.i^ yivrti'-
.. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury 
or^with an advisoryjury;*the> court shall find the 
facts: specially and state separately its conclusions of 
law thereon;' and judgment shall> be-entered pursuant 
to- Rule • 58A; ^  in^granting>or*refusing interiocutory 
. injunctions. the> court shall rsimilarry^set'lforth '^the 
findings of. fact and conclusions rof law'which?cbh-' 
stitutejthe: grounds.of^ts action^ Requests for^fihd^ 
ihgs aretmot^ * necessary:foT^purposes^df ^reviewHThe 
findings of ar master;^  to the^ extent7that~the; court 
adoputhcm^ihaU 3 be" considered iLs'the.fm 
. the^cpur^It : ^ ^ t t i ^ ^ 
and conohisions ^ pf law(are; stated oratiy^and' rdcbr 
>T rdea^ih open c w 
v ence'or,'appear in. anr opinion- orvmemorandum of 
'*•;/ decision filed by the courtr The* trial c^urrneetl not 
enter^ findings of fact^ and; conclusions of; law ^ in 
nilings on* motions, excepti as ^  provided^in-• Rule 
41(b)..TheTa3urtshaU, however; issue a brief 
f ^ ^ s t a t e r a m i r ^ I n r 4 ^ ^ 
ie> • t a « n . * ^ £ f ^ ^ ^ i t i ^ k j ^ ^ 3 * - ^ ^ 
(f) Objeenoas to Appotanmat of Mpatar.JOT.^^*7,nfT 
4 w y v > ^ j - '•miscn -Mx ;-.ht .. . . . ..- , . ..,. .?>J4# bneVfti) 
(a) AppointaMnt and Compeaaatlon. ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
-Any or ail of the ^ issues in an action may^be ref-j 
erred by the court to a master upon the written. 
consent of the parties, or the court may appoint a 
master in an action, in accordance with the provis- -
ions of subdivision (b) of this Rule^ As used in these >,t 
rulesi^the < word^master^ includes a Hrelexce,^an^ 
auditor, and anfexaminer.: The compensation to' be; > 
allowed'to a master shall be fixed by the couir^ and*-
shall;be charged upon such, of the parties pj j)aid^ 
out of any fund or subject matter of the! action, ™ 
which is in the custody and control of the court as * 
the court may direct. The master shall not retain his ; 
report as security for his compensation; but when * 
the party ordered to pay the compensation allowed 
by the court does pot pay it after notice and within 
the time prescribed by the court, the master, is enti-
tled to a writ of execution against the ^delinquent 
ffA refefence to a master shall be? tiig; ex^ee^on «nd 
not.the^ruleT- iri^  ^ ^ I p ^ b e n r W b ^ a :j\iiyfa^rejf^ 
erencetshall b e ^ d c * ^ y ' when'the issues ^ ^^^^  coni-i 
ph*catedfm actions to be tried withoutTa'jury; 
in;^nwtt«; l !of^a^u^ 
absence, jpCth .^ written! consent, of..the'- palrt^ cs^ l^ L 
made only "upon a showing that ^  some exceptional 
r4£§op5c^ ?^aftf 
The order of reference to the mastermay specify« 
xcrih>ur'his;p6weTS and^  n^ 
^6ruV'fu|^tt: partial^ 
particular acts or to receive and report evidence only' 
and -may f fix t^he^ timfcJand place- fo>be^innmg'and 
I clc^mg ; the * hearings^ and A- for^ theTfillngtf^bflthe 
^ m i m ^ r e p c ^ ^ 
?x:,'jr#.> ^ v . . - 1 
'Vtto^ffjF*'4''***'"*'*'***' 
iadki}k*^ihV&i:4py^ ';Y'^:r^.l4*yfii±th::^ 
M 4ffAHADVAN^E,^gPQgTS 
W P y w ' l f y t yMWMpqg^pr* » w » w j y 
ftse de novo vests 
bwtjrto determine 
bts of: j U parte 
xyfi^cifiAa^ljr 
A M Q«WWffif:in 
toe qua non of a 
at tain, is used to 
of a matter er 
toforc tried by 
t the nullification 
e*; ortte^jof the 
r a retrial of the 
the .judgment, or 
fc Whan jwmdic-
tribunal ^attaches, 
*der of the .firgt 
wety suspended, 
f
 * *. Q * ft* -
3»taA***fta»*41 
-3 
• lttXiUtt.COrj«r QTAPFEAI5>-' 
"Appeal* •»**«:* -
• > 
FILED: Am* T i^firy 
tribunal} docs not - . judgment of the 
w W & e a n f o f Water 
^:3M&W;2de;ifr<22 
i^enjphasis in the orih 
oofci 136 Vt, 242, 385 
Afr example of a true 
iai of a j^«tke of the 
fe£.*4ircuk <^ut. See 
14 «5wp. 1986). On 
igtoUate,. review involves 
/•of -proceedings m an 
trior for the correction 
4-15-S* the legislature 
Bi.to be a hybrid form 
« the district court to 
itial fact finder and a 
have attempted to give 
t'standard *>f review. 
perry be referred to *s 
rice, aoncnrs'ht the 
estke Durham. 
'frMjMjP 
hsjf|e>"irs.i» not alone in 
tern d«s novo. See, e.g.f 
n Heap.,.* Or. Aprf. 17*. 
suiiiag aa Oregon proce* 
rnovo on the record* and , ^ , 
id rsquhins no deference ;*4 
- . T ; ^ . ; . 
AI>MBflffTftATW»0*BER 1 
Purtuant ta tlte p*oviri<l^ of U t m Code 
Annotated-9$%6 an* Rnie Z of t i* Rules 
of the Utfch- Ceurt of ^ Appeals, tbe cowl 
orders: •'. . \V : - »/:: 
1. Appeals from * jiidgment* of the small 
claims- departihent:. of
 vcifcuit/coufts and 
appeals from:|Ui^ients^ofxfitodl odor* fol-
towing a^ Qovo rtvfew of dedsipns made by 
the s n ^ dt fmsn>^ justice'* courts 
^shsdl be dexdded.on theTecbird a* provided by 
' statute and . the JRqks of the Utah Court "of 
'Appeal / - , -r^ ^'::^>'fL^i^St' T^TST 
i However, tn'raeognition of the unique 
nature o f smallulakri* procechire^and in.Iurt-
herance.of the policy that such matters be 
handled speedily and infotmally, tbe fallowing 
shall apply to all appeak-of smallclaims cases; 
a. The record on appeal ^wilhbc deemed 
sufficient if it indudes .,.:: >, : ; v 
v
 (1) a tape tecofdi^^eontempoTafleousry 
made i>f the proceedingunder review, which 
recording - shall be of sufficient quafity to 
permit the Court of Appeals ta hear the tesr> 
imonyoffereoVand • \ w ~ ^ v £ - r ^ / ' # •x>"*':%\u 
: (2) legible photocopiesof all documents; 
offered^ admitted;* or considered atthe%proo 
ecdinrunoW-review, whether*^ 
numbered andedmitted. •'v*
 ;^ < 
te If the judgment entered in tbe procee-
ding under review was entered at the time of 
the hearing, findings of fact and condUiions 
of law* which may be in summary form* will 
be deemed sufflcsieqt if redted on the taped 
recofd. If.' thc.x proceeding • uncJery review^ was 
taken wader *&dsemcnt and judgment entered 
subsequent to the time of bearing, tech find-
ings and conclusions shall be written. 
"V'WMiu1?Yiiw imvSSti % ^ * As^consjstcnt with the informal nature 
^nSSSTflT^^^Xof small 'claims ribce<dingst7idl available 
^^Si^Vf^^^Wc^01" t 0 the admissten of. evidence shall 
~* ^ _, ^^jgbc deeriusl by the.Oxot orAr^ealf on.ir^e^ 
^ ^ ^ ^ i ^ ^ ^ t o hav^beea "timefy sind adequately made on 
^ t i e ^ ^ i 5 2 f i ^ "therecord, * ' - • :•.•.-. ^ - 1 . . • .*v 
" ^ S ^ j ^ ^ f d, A simpHHed form o^f^  the <todceting 
^ ^ ^ p " " ! ' statement for appeals from small claims jud-
gments shall be s i d e available h6m the clerk 
,
» * ^ f l » « W r * * « s - * o C the Court^of AppeaU an*shafl be us^^ 
Briefs need nbebe fBed. If brkft liave not 
5 been filed wiiti*the ttees stated 3n th^Ruies 
J>tAP! 
Ibe^tiiAJeoi'ojn thefinerits bvt u raising enry 
^thestetwoUsues: l"-vJ,i-'••.".:,: *• 
* <1) there is not sufHcierv admissible^ 
x^wnr>ftent ^viderKe \U> support the lower 
court? s ftgfftagsrgnd' ' : - % ' -
^made '^the judjsmritfwai erroneous as a mttter
 t^  
^ V e ^ A I l appealf ifiom^maB efahns judgm^ 
coa^baU be initia^ assignefl to the law aed 
modee pan<l< - *v \«»? -^  ' *" 
BYOltDBROPIKKCOUKT 
JBd*wdAprtt7.19«7 
• lUgMl W» Oarff 
; Pntmat Svdgt '. ', "; } • ' 
J j a f e ^ ^l^S»fMJ 
,41 
?*?«/•-«<*«» •< 
««*-,•> r^». 
13TAH COVRT QF M H P B U L S ^ 
SAN JUAN FOOUfM/er&tti 
F u i -
ftatatifi- . ..ju, . 
Daiid SWEENEY, x 
FanoVaadUt* 
Defendants. 
^e)»" geaw97^uA" 
^r 
" • - . !".<•;-.:, - . ' - v ; ' 
IfllreMsee^^tafc 
F ^ d f and Utah 
Defendants. 
No. Saowfg-CA 
Before Jadges 
FILEIHApril>9 
ATTOHNEYS: .*• .. "A-->"' "'"" / *'}. '-..§ C>.%: 
James R. Black and Susan B. D i u i a f e r ^ ^ v ^ 
Plaintiff f> -r- r ^ ^ . ^ | * * " ^ 
Erie V; tooprmin,. Rnsseff Hacfi^ y, Leanard . 
^ W. Stfflman for DeferKturts, 
r Plaintiffs challe^ge^ the-
sibn^; order requfaing\^M0IH^w<^^iim 
e n ^ temporary total oipiWHty compinsadon , 
ajid^toedkal care for two employees whp sws-
udnediadusr^tfin^riis^ 
UMil atsatilHry 
^featHvjftwfcuaiMaiAi 
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As intimated by the majority, the trial judge 
in the instant case made no finding as to the 
sufficiency of independent evidence. At the 
conclusion of the State's case, appellant 
moved to suppress all evidence related to the 
blood test. The court took the matter under 
advisement and requested both parties to 
prepare and submit briefs on the motion. The 
State then suggested rather than wait for the 
court's ruling on the motion, appellant should 
proceed to present his case. In response, 
appellant explained that only if the court 
denied his motion would he then call expert 
witnesses to refute the State's claim of suffi-
cient independent evidence. The court there-
upon continued the balance of the trial to 
January 30, 1986. In a minute entry dated 
December 19, 1985, the date of trial, the court 
recorded: 
Prosecution evidence was presented. 
Attorneys will submit briefs by 
January 24, 1986 for Judge to det-
ermine admissability [sic] of certain 
evidence presented. Court's deter-
mination of admissability [sic] will 
determine whether or not defense 
evidence needs to be presented. 
Further hearing and/or disposition 
scheduled for January 30,1986. 
In a decision dated January 23, 1986, the 
court denied appellant's motion to exclude 
and admitted the blood test result into evid-
ence. When trial reconvened on January 30, 
appellant, in light of the court's ruling, 
offered no evidence. The court then found the 
^allegations in the petition to be true and 
e^ntered judgment against appellant. 
-J The trial court clearly reserved any finding 
[Whether sufficient evidence existed, indepen-
dent of the blood test, to find appellant in 
"violation of section 41-6-44(1). In its find-
ings and decree, the court determined appel-
Jlam was under the influence of alcohol based 
isplely on a blood alcohol level of .18%. 
^The majority opinion, in light of the trial 
court's failure to do so, proceeds to make its 
own finding of sufficient independent evidence 
'to'affirm the judgment. However, it is not the 
function of this Court to make findings of 
[jhcL Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336 (Utah 
f*979). Nor is it the function of "an appellate 
'court to decide disputed questions of fact in 
j . « first instance and then choose between 
j*ftjrmance and reversal by testing its factual 
^pclusion against that which the trial court 
ought have or ... must have reached for it to 
jWie the judgment it did/ Sicpon v. Nicponf 
j&Mich. App. 373, 157 N.W.2d 464, 467 
[ 8 2 ^ (Emphasis in original.) Rather, the 
LfSJPctfon of this Court is to review the record 
[^determine whether substantial evidence 
[SSJto to support the trial court's findings. 
iK*mschiissel v. Russell, 649 P.2d 26 (Utah 
^»2). 
The judgment in the instant case was based 
solely on the blood test. As the trial court 
failed to make a finding of sufficient indepe-
ndent evidence of intoxication, I would 
remand the case for a new trial. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Cite as 
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IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Dana A. MEIER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
HOBBS 6 SONS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Before Judges Billings, Davidson and Garff. 
No. 870028-CA 
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ATTORNEYS: 
Dana A. Meier, Pro Se. 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION 
PER CURIAM: 
This is an appeal from a judgment of the 
Small Claims Department of the Fifth Judicial 
Circuit Court seeking recovery for replacement 
of a damaged sewer lateral. Although plaintiff 
allegedly incurred damages in the amount of 
$2,092.30, he elected to proceed in Small 
Claims Court where his recovery would be 
limited to $1,000.00. Plaintiff originally filed 
affidavits with the court alleging liability of 
Hobbs & Sons, Kehl Building (later changed 
to Arnold Development Co.), Tayiorsville-
Bennion Improvement District, and Frank 
Armstrong. At the time of the hearing, plai-
ntiff had effected service on all defendants 
except Arnold Development Company. 
The case was heard on December 23, 1986 
before Judge Pro Tern David Berceau. The 
hearing involved testimony of a number of 
witnesses, including plaintiff Dana Meier and 
his wife, defendant Frank Armstrong, two 
representatives of defendant Taylorsville-
Bennion Improvement District, two represen-
tatives of defendant Hobbs & Sons, and a 
witness called by plaintiff. At. the time of the 
hearing, the judge dismissed plaintiffs claims 
against Taylorsville-Bennion Improvement 
District and Frank Armstrong. The case pro-
ceeded against Hobbs St Sons, a sub-
contractor that was involved in installation of 
For complete Utah Code Annotations, consult Code • Co's Annotation Service 
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the main sewer line and the sewer lateral. 
The case against Hobcs & Sons involved 
several issues of fact. Plaintiff alleged that on 
the first occasion when the washing machine 
was used, sewage backcd-up into his base-
ment. Plaintiff and his witness, the contractor 
who excavated the lateral under the street, 
claimed that a portion of the lateral was 
crushed and exhibited marks that appeared to 
have been made by a backhoe. The section of 
pipe was produced for examination by the 
judge at the hearing. Plaintiff contends, based 
on this evidence, that the sewer lateral was 
crushed during installation by Hobbs & Sons 
and that it was this damage that caused the 
back-up. Plaintiff seeks to recoup costs att-
ributable to repair of the sewer lateral. Defe-
ndant Hobbs & Sons raised a number of 
factual issues and defenses represented by the 
following allegations: 
1. That Hobbs & Sons was not the 
contractor who installed the sewer, 
but merely completed the job for 
another contractor. 
2c That Hobbs & Sons did not exist 
as a legal entity at the time of 
construction of the sewer. 
3. That the 'break* in the lateral 
under the street actually resulted 
from the negligence of the contra-
ctor hired to repair the sewer and 
the real cause of the back-up was 
an obstruction under the sidewalk. 
4. That the obstruction was located 
on plaintiffs property and not 
under the street; therefore, Hobbs 
& Sons could not be responsible for 
the damage. 
5. That a number of other parties 
dug in the area of the sewer lateral 
between the original construction 
and the extension of the sewer to 
plaintiffs home. 
At the conclusion of testimony on December 
23, 1986, the judge indicated that he would 
take the case under advisement. On January 
14, 1987, the judge signed a printed Small 
Claims Judgment form indicating judgment in 
favor of plaintiff in the statutory amount. 
Written on the form is the statement, "Judg-
ment against Hobbs & Sons only - As 
to the other defendants served and present at 
trial, the claims are dismissed with prejudice/ 
No findings of fact were made orally at the 
time of the hearing, nor were written findings 
submitted in support of the judgment against 
Hobbs & Sons. 
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Pre* 
cedure (as in effect at the time of the hearing) 
required, in relevant part: 
In ail actions tried upon the facts 
without a jury ... the court shall 
find the facts specially and state 
separately its conclusions of law 
thereon, and judgment shall be 
entered pursuant to Rule 58A.... 
In April of 1987 and subsequent to the 
transfer to the Utah Court of Appeals., of 
appellate jurisdiction over cases from the small 
claims department of the circuit courts, Jfciis 
court adopted Court of Appeals Administra-
tive Order 1, 55 Utah Adv. Rep. 41 (1987), 
titled *In the Matter of Procedures in Small 
Claims Appeals/ That order modified the 
requirements of Rule 52(a)1 of the Rules of 
Civil Procedure as applied to appeals from 
judgments of the small claims department, as 
follows: 
If the judgment entered in the 
proceeding under review was 
entered at the time of the hearing, 
findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, which may be in summary 
form, will be deemed sufficient if 
recited on the taped record. If the 
proceeding under review was taken 
under advisement and judgment 
entered subsequent to the time of 
hearing, such findings and conclu-
sions shall be written. 
Even under the liberalized standards of Court 
of Appeals Administrative Order 1, the record 
in the present case is not sufficient to permit 
appellate review by this court The case is, 
accordingly, remanded for the entry of find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law. The fin-
dings and conclusions will be deemed adequate 
if consistent with the standards of Court of 
Appeals Administrative Order 1. 
ALL CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
R. W Garff, Judge 
I. Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, was 
amended, effective January 1, 1987, to provide that 
it is 'sufficient if the findings of fact and conclus-
ions of law are stated orally and recorded in open 
court following the close of evidence or appear in an 
opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the 
court.* 
For complete Utah Code Annotations, consult Codc+Co'i Annotation Senrice 
